Abstract. It is generally believed that data mining results do not violate the anonymity of the individuals recorded in the source database. In fact, data mining models and patterns, in order to ensure a required statistical significance, represent a large number of individuals and thus conceal individual identities: this is the case of the minimum support threshold in association rule mining. In this paper we show that this belief is ill-founded. By shifting the concept of k-anonymity from data to patterns, we formally characterize the notion of a threat to anonymity in the context of pattern discovery, and provide a methodology to efficiently and effectively identify all possible such threats that might arise from the disclosure of a set of extracted patterns.
Introduction
Privacy Preserving Data Mining, i.e., the analysis of data mining side-effects on privacy, has recently become a key research issue and is receiving a growing attention from the research community [1, 3, 9, 16] . However, despite such efforts, a common understanding of what is meant by "privacy" is still missing. This fact has led to the proliferation of many completely different approaches to privacy preserving data mining, all sharing the same generic goal: producing a valid mining model without disclosing "private" data. As highlighted in [9] , the approaches pursued so far leave a privacy question open: do the data mining results themselves violate privacy? Put in other words, do the disclosure of extracted patterns open up the risk of privacy breaches that may reveal sensitive information? During the last year, few works [7, 9, 11] have tried to address this problem by some different points of view, but they all require some a priori knowledge of what is sensitive and what is not.
In this paper we study when data mining results represent per se a threat to privacy, independently of any background knowledge of what is sensitive. In particular, we focus on individual privacy, which is concerned with the anonymity of individuals.
A prototypical application instance is in the medical domain, where the collected data are typically very sensitive, and the kind of privacy usually required is the anonymity of the patients in a survey. Consider a medical institution where the usual hospital activity is coupled with medical research activity. Since physicians are the data collectors and holders, and they already know everything about their patients, they have unrestricted access to the collected information. Therefore, they can perform real mining on all available information using traditional mining tools -not necessarily the privacy preserving ones. This way they maximize the outcome of the knowledge discovery process, without any concern about privacy of the patients which are recorded in the data. But the anonymity of patients becomes a key issue when the physicians want to share their discoveries (e.g., association rules holding in the data) with their scientific community.
At a first sight, it seems that data mining results do not violate the anonymity of the individuals recorded in the source database. In fact, data mining models and patterns, in order to ensure a required statistical significance, represent a large number of individuals and thus conceal individual identities: this is the case of the minimum support threshold in association rule mining. The next example shows that the above belief is ill-founded. Example 1. Consider the following association rule:
where sup and conf are the usual interestingness measures of support and confidence as defined in [2] . Since the given rule holds for a number of individuals (80), which seems large enough to protect individual privacy, one could conclude that the given rule can be safely disclosed. But, is this all the information contained in such a rule? Indeed, one can easily derive the support of the premise of the rule:
Given that the pattern a 1 ∧ a 2 ∧ a 3 ∧ a 4 holds for 80 individuals, and that the pattern a 1 ∧ a 2 ∧ a 3 holds for 81 individuals, we can infer that in our database there is just one individual for which the pattern a 1 ∧ a 2 ∧ a 3 ∧ ¬a 4 holds.
The knowledge inferred is a clear threat to the anonymity of that individual: on one hand the pattern identifying the individual could itself contain sensitive information; on the other hand it could be used to re-identify the same individual in other databases.
It is worth noting that this problem is very general: the given rule could be, instead of an association, a classification rule, or the path from the root to the leaf in a decision tree, and the same reasoning would still hold. Moreover, it is straightforward to note that, unluckily, the more accurate is a rule, the more unsafe it may be w.r.t. anonymity. As shown later, this anonymity problem can not be simply solved by discarding the most accurate rules: in fact, more complex kinds of threats to anonymity exist which involve more than simply two itemsets.
Related Works
During the last years a novel problem has emerged in privacy-preserving data mining [7, 9, 11] : do the data mining results themselves violate privacy? Only little preliminary work is available. The work in [9] studies the case of a classifier trained over a mixture of different kind of data: public (known to every one including the adversary), private/sensitive (should remain unknown to the adversary), and unknown (neither sensitive nor known by the adversary). The authors propose a model for privacy implication of the learned classifier.
In [11] the data owner, rather than sharing the data, prefers to share the mined association rules, but requires that a set of restricted association rules are not disclosed. The authors propose a framework to sanitize the output of association rules mining, while blocking some inference channels for the restricted rules.
In [7] a framework for evaluating classification rules in terms of their perceived privacy and ethical sensitivity is described. The proposed framework empowers the data miner with alerts for sensitive rules that can be accepted or dismissed by the user as appropriate. Such alerts are based on an aggregate sensitivity combination function, which assigns to each rule a value of sensitivity by aggregating the sensitivity value (an integer between 0 and 9) of each attribute involved in the rule. The process of labelling each attribute with its sensitivity value must be accomplished by the domain expert.
The fundamental difference of these approaches with ours lies in generality: we propose a novel, objective definition of privacy compliance of patterns without any reference to a preconceived knowledge of sensitive data or patterns, on the basis of the rather intuitive and realistic constraint that the anonymity of individuals should be guaranteed.
An important method for protecting individual privacy is k-anonymity, introduced in [14] , a notion that establishes that the cardinality of the answer to any possible query should be at least k. In this work, it is shown that protection of individual sources does not guarantee protection when sources are cross-examined: a sensitive medical record, for instance, can be uniquely linked to a named voter record in a publicly available voter list through some shared attributes. The objective of k-anonymity is to eliminate such opportunities of inferring private information through cross linkage. In particular, this is obtained by a "sanitization" of the source data that is transformed in such a way that, for all possible queries, at least k tuples will be returned. Such a sanitization is obtained by generalization and suppression of attributes and/or tuples [15] .
Trivially, by mining a k-anonymized database no patterns threatening the anonymity can be obtained. But such mining would produce models impoverished by the information loss which is intrinsic in the generalization and suppression techniques. Since our objective is to extract valid and interesting patterns, we propose to postpone kanonymization after the actual mining step. In other words, we do not to enforce kanonymity onto the source data, but instead we move such a concept to the extracted patterns.
Paper Contributions
In this paper we study the privacy problem described above in the very general setting of patterns which are boolean formulas over a binary database. Our contribution is twofold:
-we define k-anonymous patterns and provide a general characterization of inference channels holding among patterns that may threat anonymity of source data; -we develop an effective and efficient algorithm to detect such potential threats, which yields a methodology to check whether the mining results may be disclosed without any risk of violating anonymity.
We emphasize that the capability of detecting the potential threats is extremely useful for the analyst to determine a trade-off among the quality of mining result and the privacy guarantee, by means of an iterative interaction with the proposed detection algorithm. Our empirical experiments, reported in this paper, bring evidence to this observation. It should also be noted the different setting w.r.t. the other works in privacy preserving data mining: in our context no data perturbation or sanitization is performed; we allow real mining on the real data, while focussing on the anonymity preservation properties of the extracted patterns. We have also developed possible strategies to eliminate the threats to anonymity by introducing distortion on the dangerous patterns in a controlled way: for lack of space these results are omitted here but can be found in [5] .
k-Anonymous Patterns and σ-Frequent Itemsets
We start by defining binary databases and patterns following the notation in [8] . According to Def. 2, e ∧ (¬b ∨ ¬d), where b, d, e ∈ I, is a pattern. One of the most important properties of a pattern is its frequency in the database, i.e. the number of individuals (transactions) in the database which make the given pattern true The most studied pattern class is the itemset, i.e., a conjunction of positive valued variables, or in other words, a set of items. The retrieval of itemsets which satisfy a minimum frequency property is the basic step of many data mining tasks, including (but not limited to) association rules [2, 4] . 
Itemsets are usually denoted in the form of set of the items in the conjunction, e.g. {i 1 , . . . , i m }; or sometimes, simply i 1 . . . i m . Figure 1(b) shows the different notation used for general patterns and for itemsets. The problem addressed in this paper is given by the possibility of inferring from the output of frequent itemset mining, i.e, F(D, σ), the existence of patterns with very low support (i.e., smaller than an anonymity threshold k, but not null): such patterns represent a threat for the anonymity of the individuals about which they are true.
Notation: patterns
Definition 5. Given a database D and an anonymity threshold k, a pattern p is said to
Problem Definition
Before introducing our anonymity preservation problem, we need to define the inference of supports, which is the basic tool for the attacks to anonymity.
Definition 6.
A set S of pairs X, n , where X ∈ 2
I
and n ∈ N, and a database D are said to be σ-compatible if S = F(D, σ). Given a pattern p we say that S |= sup(p) > x (respectively S |= sup(p) < x) if, for all databases D σ-compatible with S, we have that
Informally, we call inference channel any subset of the collection of itemsets (with their respective supports), from which it is possible to infer non k-anonymous patterns. Our mining problem can be seen as frequent pattern extraction with two frequency thresholds: the usual minimum support threshold σ for itemsets (as defined in Definition 4), and an anonymity threshold k for general patterns (as defined in Definition 2).
Note that an itemset with support less than k is itself a non k-anonymous, and thus dangerous, pattern. However, since we can safely assume (as we will do in the rest of this paper) that σ k, such pattern would be discarded by the usual mining algorithms.
Definition 7. Given a collection of frequent itemsets F(D, σ)
and an anonymity threshold k, our problem consists in detecting all possible inference channels C ⊆ F(D, σ) : ∃p ∈ Pat(I) :
Obviously, a solution to this problem directly yields a method to formally prove that the disclosure of a given collection of frequent itemsets does not violate the anonymity constraint: it is sufficient to check that no inference channel exists for the given collection. In this case, the collection can be safely distributed even to malicious adversaries. On the contrary, if this is not the case, we can proceed in two ways:
-mine a new collection of frequent itemsets under different circumstances, e.g., higher minimum support threshold, to look for an admissible collection; -transform (sanitize) the collection to remove the inference channels.
The second alternative opens up many interesting mining problems, which are omitted here for lack of space, and are discussed in [5] .
Detecting Inference Channels
In this Section we study how information about non k-anonymous patterns can be possibly inferred from a collection of σ-frequent itemsets. As suggested by Example 1, a simple inference channel is given by any itemset X which has a superset X ∪ {a} such that 0 < sup D (X) − sup D (X ∪ {a}) < k. In this case the pair X, sup D (X) , X ∪ {a}, sup D (X ∪ {a}) is an inference channel for the non kanonymous pattern X ∧ ¬a, whose support is directly given by sup D (X) − sup D (X ∪ {a}). This is a trivial kind of inference channel. Do more complex structures of itemsets exist that can be used as inference channels? In general, the support of a pattern p = i 1 ∧ · · · ∧ i m ∧ ¬a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬a n can be inferred if we know the support of itemsets I = {i 1 , . . . , i m }, J = I ∪ {a 1 , . . . , a n }, and every itemset L such that I ⊂ L ⊂ J.
Lemma 8. Given a pattern p
where I = {i 1 , . . . , i m } and J = I ∪ {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof follows directly from the definition of support and the wellknown inclusion-exclusion principle [10] .
Following the notation in [6] , we denote the right-hand side of the equation above as f Proof. The case of a conjunctive pattern p is a direct consequence of Lemma 8. Let us now consider a generic pattern p ∈ Pat(I). Without loss of generality p is in normal disjunctive form: p = p 1 ∨ . . . ∨ p q , where p 1 . . . p q are conjunctive patterns. We have that:
From Theorem 11 we conclude that all possible threats to anonymity are due to inference channels of the form C J I . However we can divide such inference channels in two subgroups:
1. inference channels involving only frequent itemsets; 2. inference channels involving also infrequent itemsets.
The first problem, addressed in the rest of this paper, is the most essential. In fact, a malicious adversary can easily find inference channels made up only of elements which are present in the disclosed output. However, these inference channels are not the unique possible source of inference: further inference channels involving also infrequent itemsets could be possibly discovered, albeit in a much more complex way.
In fact, in [6] deduction rules to derive tight bounds on the support of itemsets are introduced. Given an itemset J, if for each subset I ⊂ J the support sup D (I) is known, such rules allow to compute lower and upper bounds on the support of J. Let l be the greatest lower bound we can derive, and u the smallest upper bound we can derive: if we find that l = u then we can infer that sup D (J) = l = u without actual counting. In this case J is said to be a derivable itemset. We transpose such deduction techniques in our context and observe that they can be exploited to discover information about infrequent itemsets, and from these to infer non k-anonymous patterns. For lack of space, this higher-order problem is not discussed here, and left to the extended version of this paper. However, here we can say that the techniques to detect this kind of inference channels and to block them are very similar to the techniques for the first kind of channels. This is due to the fact that both kinds of channels rely on the same concept: inferring supports of larger itemsets from smaller ones. Indeed, the key equation of our work (Lemma 8) is also the basis of the deduction rules proposed in [6] .
From now on we restrict our attention to the essential form of inference channel, namely those involving frequent itemsets only. In the following Section we study some interesting properties that allow to dramatically reduce the number of checks needed to retrieve Ch(k, F(D, σ)).
A Condensed Representation of Inference Channels
In this section we introduce a condensed representation of Ch(k, F(D, σ)), i.e., a subset of Ch(k, F(D, σ)) which is more efficient to compute, and sufficient to reconstruct the whole Ch(k, F(D, σ)). The benefits of having such condensed representation go far beyond mere efficiency. In fact, removing the redundancy existing in Ch(k, F(D, σ)), we also implicitly avoid redundant sanitization, when we will block inference channels holding in F(D, σ) (recall that, as stated before, the issue of how to block inference channels is not covered in this paper).
Consider, for instance, the two inference channels C acd ad , 1 and C abcd abd , 1 holding in the database in Fig. 1(a) : one is more specific than the other, but they both uniquely identify transaction t 7 . It is easy to see that many other families of equivalent, and thus redundant, inference channels can be found. How can we directly identify one and only one representative inference channel in each family of equivalent ones? The theory of closed itemsets can help us with this problem.
Closed itemsets were first introduced in [12] and since then they have received a great deal of attention especially by an algorithmic point of view [17, 13] . They are a concise and lossless representation of all frequent itemsets, i.e., they contain the same information without redundancy. Intuitively, a closed itemset groups together all its subsets that have its same support; or in other words, it groups together itemsets which identify the same group of transactions.
Definition 13.
Given the function f (T ) = {i ∈ I | ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ t}, which returns all the items included in the set of transactions T , and the function g(X) = {t ∈ T | ∀i ∈ X, i ∈ t} which returns the set of transactions supporting a given itemset X, the composite function c = f • g is the closure operator. An itemset I is closed iff and only if c(I) = I. Given a database D and a minimum support threshold σ, the set of frequent closed itemsets is denoted Cl(D, σ). An itemset I ∈ Cl(D, σ) is said to be maximal iff
Analogously to what happens for the pattern class of itemsets, if we consider the pattern class of conjunctive patterns we can rely on the anti-monotonicity property of frequency. For instance, the number of transactions for which the pattern a ∧ ¬c holds is always larger than the number of transactions for which the pattern a ∧ b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d holds.
Definition 14. Given two inference channels
Therefore, when detecting inference channels, whenever we find a C 
Anonymity vs. Accuracy: Empirical Observations
Algorithm 2 represents an optimized way to identify all threats to anonymity. Its performance revealed adequate in all our empirical evaluations using various datasets from the FIMI repository
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; in all such cases the time improvement from the Naïve (Algorithm 1) to the optimized algorithm is about one order of magnitude. This level of efficiency allows an interactive-iterative use of the algorithm by the analyst, aimed at finding the best trade-off among privacy and accuracy of the collection of patterns. To be more precise, there is a conflict among keeping the support threshold as low as possible, in order to mine all interesting patterns, and avoiding the generation of anonymity threats. The best solution to this problem is precisely to find out the minimum support threshold that generates a collection of patterns with no threats. The plots in Figure 3 illustrate this point: on the x-axis we report the minimum support threshold, on the y-axis we report the total number of threats (the cardinality of MCh(k, Cl(D, σ))), and the various curves indicate such number according to different values of the anonymity threshold k. In Figure 3 (a) we report the plot for the MUSHROOM dataset (a dense one), while in Figure 3 (b) we report the plot for the KOSARAK dataset which is sparse. In both cases, it is evident the value of the minimum support threshold that represents the best trade-off, for any given value of k. However, in certain cases, the best support threshold can still be too high to mine a sufficient quantity of interesting patterns. In such cases, the only option is to allow lower support thresholds and then to block the inference channels in the mining outcome. This problem, as stated before, is not covered in this paper for lack of space, and will be presented in a forthcoming paper.
the above aim, we formalized the threats to anonymity by means of inference channel through frequent itemsets, and provided practical algorithms to detect such channels.
Other issues, emerging from our approach, are worth a deeper investigation and are left to future research. These include: (i) a thorough comparison of the various different approaches that may be used to block inference channels; (ii) a comprehensive empirical evaluation of our approach: to this purpose we are conducting a large-scale experiment with real life bio-medical data about patients to assess both applicability and scalability of the approach in a realistic, challenging domain; (iii) an investigation whether the proposed notion of privacy-preserving pattern discovery may be generalized to other forms of patterns and models.
In any case, the importance of the advocated form of privacy-preserving pattern discovery is evident: demonstrably trustworthy data mining techniques may open up tremendous opportunities for new knowledge-based applications of public utility and large societal and economic impact.
